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Penal Code §§799, 800 (amended).
AB 1642; STATS 1970, Ch 704
Kidnapping for ransom, extortion or robbery (Section 209) no
longer has a statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for for-
gery now begins to run from the discovery of the crime, rather than from
the commission of the crime.
Section 800 provides the time limitations for bringing an indictmnnt
or filing an information for any felony except certain more serious of-
fenses as enumerated in the section. As a general rule, an indictment
mist be brought, an information filed, or a case certified to the superior
court within three years after the commission of any felony. The excep-
tions to this rule are:
1) There is no time limit on murder, the embezzlement of public money
or falsification of public records. This amendment adds a Section 209
violation (kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or robbery) to this pro-
vision repealing the statute of limitations on prosecution of this typu of
kidnapping.
2) The time limit for the acceptance of a bribe by a public official o a
public employee is six years from commission of the crime. There is no
change here.
3) The time limit for grand theft or forgery is three years after discovery
of the crime. This provision originally applied only to grand theft.
This amendmcnt now allows a person to be prosecuted for forgery up to
three years after discovery of the crime, rather than three years from
commission of the crime.
References:
1) 1 WrTrIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Defenses §235 (1963).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISL-
TION 165.
Murder of Fetus
Penal Code § 187 (amended).
AB 816; STATS 1970, Ch 1311
Chapter 1311 amends California Penal Code Section 187, relating to
murder.
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This amendment marks the first change in California's basic murder
statute since its enactment in 1872. The amended Section now provides
that a fetus may be the subject of murder, though the statute does not
define fetus as a human being.
This amendment was enacted in response to a June 1970 decision of
the California Supreme Court (Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d
619) which held that when the California Legislature enacted the origi-
nal statute it did not intend to include a fetus within the purview of the
statute. This holding was on the basis of the common law rule at the
time the statute was enacted, and the early legislature's declarations to
the effect that the common law was the rule of decision in California.
The court held that to change the interpretation of the statute at this
late date would deprive a defendant of due process of law.
The new statute does not extend to manslaughter cases. In addition,
the Section itself contains three exceptions. The first excepts abortions
performed pursuant to the Therapeutic Abortion Act (Chapter II, Di-
vision 20, commencing with Section 25950, of the Health and Safety
Code).
The second exception was inserted by the author of the legislation in
response to the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Belous,
[80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969)]. That case held California's criminal
abortion statute unconstitutional, saying that permitting an abortion only
"where necessary to preserve the life of the mother" did not offer suffi-
cient guidance to the doctor performing the abortion as to whether or not
he was acting within the law. It thus violated his rights to due process
to be convicted under the law so worded. The Belous court did suggest
language they thought might be appropriate and constitutional, and this
language was paraphrased in the second exception to the legislation.
The exception allows for an abortion to be performed without being
classified as murder when the abortion is performed under circumstances
where there is medical certainty the result of childbirth would be death of
the mother or the fetus or where her death from childbirth, although
not medically certain, would be substantially certain or more likely than
not. [Section 187 (b) (2)].
The third exception is where the act was solicited, aided, abetted, or
consented to by the mother of the fetus. [Section 187 (b) (3)].
The effect of this amendment is that whenever acts otherwise suffi-
cient to constitute murder result in the death of a fetus, at any point after
conception, the one commiting the acts may be tried and convicted for
murder. Previously, a murder conviction could not have been ob-
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taned unless the child had been born alive and then died from the in-
juries inflicted. [See Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, LAW QuAR-
TERLY REV. 134 (1904)]
Assault With Deadly Weapon; penalties, definition of peace
officer
Penal Code §245 (amended).
SB 84; STATS 1970, Ch 796
As amended subdivision (a) of Section 245 prescribes the punit;h-
ment for "every person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon
or instrument or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury" as imprisonment in the state prison for six months to life, or in
county jail not to exceed one year or a fine of $5,000 or both. For-
merly the period of imprisonment was not to exceed 10 years.
The amendment to subdivision (b) of Section 256 changes the pun-
ishment for this type of assault when committed upon a peace officer or
fireman by any person who knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is a peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his
duties. The punishment is now prescribed as a sentence in the state
prison for six months to life rather than the former maximum of 15
years.
By amendment in 1961 subdivision (b) was added to Section 245
prescribing the punishment as a maximum of 10 years. In 1965 this
was amended to not exceed a period of imprisonment of 15 years. For
a subsequent offense the sentence prescribed was from 5 years to life
rather than the previous period of not less than five years nor more than
15 years.
By amendment in 1966 firemen were added to subdivision (b) result-
ing in equal punishment for assault on a peace officer or fireman.
This amendment also expands the definition of peace officer to in-
clude each member of a state college police department and each mem-
ber of a security patrol of a school district, both appointed respectively
pursuant to Education Code Sections 24651 and 15832.
Reference:
1) 3A McKINNEY'S CAL. DIG. Assault and Battery §§ 16-42 (1963).
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Solicitation
Penal Code §653f (amended).
AB 953; STATS 1970, Ch 682
Section 653f is expanded to include within the statutory crime of
solicitation any solicitation to commit assault with a deadly weapon, or
any assault perpetrated by means of force or violence likely to produce
great bodily harm.
Formerly the statute made no provision for a solicitation to commit
assault with a deadly weapon. Since all crimes in California are statu-
tory, a person who solicited another to commit an assault committed no
crime if the solicitation was refused (if it was accepted he might be
prosecuted for conspiracy; if the assault was completed, he might be
liable as a principal).
This Section is also amended to provide a more stringent penalty for
anyone convicted of the crime of solicitation, whether for solicitation of
assault with a deadly weapon or for solicitation of the crimes previously
codified. Any solicitation now enumerated under this provision is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for up to a year, in state
prison for up to 5 years, or by a fine up to $5,000, or both fine and im-
prisonment. Previously, the punishment was either fine or imprison-
ment.
This legislation was sponsored by the California District Attorneys
Association and the California Peace Officers Association.
References:
1) 1 WrUN's, CALTFORN CRIMES, Elements of Crime §76 (1963).
2) Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 953 (1957).
Obscene Matter; live conduct
Penal Code §§311, 311.6, 312.1 (amended).
SB 806; STATS 1970, Ch 1072
This amendment to Penal Code Section 311 adds live conduct which
is adjudged to be obscene to that conduct outlined as punishable in the
Penal Code.
Prior to the amendment, which was sponsored by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office and the Peace Officers Association, the only code section
dealing specifically with live conduct was Penal Code Section 311.6
prohibiting vocalization of obscene songs.
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The amendment to Section 311 adds paragraph (g) to specifically
define obscene live conduct as any physical human body activity whether
performed or engaged in alone or with other persons, including but not
limited to singing, speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomim-
ing, where taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the
average person, applying contemporary standards, is to the prurient in-
terest; goes beyond customary limits of candor; and is utterly without
redeeming social importance.
Section 311.6 is amended to provide that anyone who knowingly en-
gages or participates in, manages, produces, sponsors, presents or ex-
hibits obscene live conduct to or before an assembly or audience consist-
ing of at least one person or spectator in any public place or in any place
exposed to public view, or in any place opened to the public whether
or not an admission fee is charged, or whether a membership card is re-
quired is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 312.1 was amended to provide that in any obscenity prosecu-
tion neither the prosecution nor the defense shall be required to intro-
duce expert witness testimony concerning the obscene or harmful charac-
te:r of the matter or live conduct which is the subject of any such pro:e-
cution. The reference to live conduct was included pursuant to this
araendment.
References:
1) Dixon v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 276 CAL. APr.
2d 789 (1968).
2) 1 Wrrmn, CALIFORNIA CRITEs, Crimes Against Decency and Morals § §550, 351
(1963).
Distribution of Harmful Matter to Minors
Penal Code §§313.1, 313.2 (amended).
AB 905; STATS 1970, Ch 257
ISection 313.1 of the Penal Code deals with distribution or exhibition
of harmful matter to minors. Harmful (obscene) matter is defined tin-
der Section 313 and embodies the definition expressed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Roth v. U.S., [354 U.S. 476 (1957)] modified by A
Book, etc. v. Attorney General (Fanny Hill), [383 U.S. 413 (1966)]
and applied to minors in Mishkin v. New York, [383 U.S. 502 (1966)].
This Section is amended to provide that any person who misrepre-
sents himself as the parent or guardian of a minor thereby causing the
minor to be admitted to an exhibition of harmful (obscene) matter is
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 2
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guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 313.2 was redrafted and creates an ex-
ception to Section 313.1 by providing that a parent or guardian will
not be liable for permitting his child or ward to attend any exhibition
of harmful matter so long as the parent or guardian accompanies the
minor; that one who exhibits harmful matter to a minor shall not be
guilty of a misdemeanor if the minor is accompanied by his parent or
guardian; or if an adult accompanies a minor and represents himself to
be the parent or guardian of the minor, the exhibitor will not be liable
so long as the exhibitor has no reason to know that such representations
are false.
Reference:
I) Comment, Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, 36 CAL. S.B.J. 795 (1961).
Disruption of Judicial Proceedings; picketing and parading
Penal Code § 169 (new).
AB 2174; STATS 1970, Ch 1411
SB 1416; STATS 1970, Ch 1444
This Act adds a new section to the Penal Code which is intended to
prevent the disruption of court proceedings.
Section 169 makes it a misdemeanor for a person to picket or parade
in or near a building which houses a court of this state with the intent
to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the proceedings, or to influence a
judge, juror, witness, or officer of the court in the discharge of his official
duties.
Presently, California statutes prohibit various types of conduct which
might be defined as "speech and assembly"; i.e., being on posted prop-
erty without written permission of the owner (Penal Code Section 555),
disturbance of the peace on colleges and universities (Penal Code
Section 415.5) or disturbance of the peace in general (Penal Code
Section 416).
A long tradition of U.S. Supreme Court cases have reasoned that
peaceful picketing or parading is the kind of conduct within the para-
meters of the first amendment protection [Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940)].
However, the Court has held that a state has a legitimate interest in
protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a
court house might create. This reasoning was part of the Court's deci-
sion in Cox v. Louisiana [379 U.S. 559 (1965)] which inter alia re-
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versed a conviction of demonstrators charged with court house picket-
ing. To understand the applicability of the Cox case to new Section 169
of the Penal Code the Louisiana law should be compared. Modeled
after a 1950 Congressional Act (18 U.S.C. .150 7 ) it provided:
"Whoever, with intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding
the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any
judge, juror, witness or court officer, in the discharge of his duty
pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the
State of Louisiana. .. shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both." [La. Rev.
Stats. §14.40 (Cum. Supp. 1970)].
There is remarkable similarity between the California and Louisiana
laws particularly the phrase "pickets or parades in or near a building
housing a court".
The court referred to the Louisiana statute as "... a precise, nar-
rowly drawn regulatory statute which proscribes certain specific be-
havior" and valid on its face. However, the Court reversed the convic-
tion under this statute because the defendant was convicted of picketing
near the courthouse after being given permission by enforcement ofti-
cers to hold a demonstration in the location. The Court reasoned that
the term "near" did not render the statute void for vagueness in con-
travention of the due process clause of the 14th amendment but c;rve
limited discretion to the officers, which once acted on by permitting a
demonstration, justified the conclusion on the part of the demonstrators
that their conduct was valid. Hence, the subsequent dispensal order
and consequential arrests served as "an indefensible sort of entrapment."
Therefore, taking the Cox decision on its face, it would appear that
Section 169 is a valid exercise of state authority absent a factual situa-
tion like the Cox case.
This Act was adopted as an emergency statute declaring that the ad-
ministration of justice is being threatened because of the extent to which
such picketing and parading is disrupting the proceedings and influenc-
ing the court.
Reference:
1) 3 WrraN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §60A (Supp. 1969);
2 WrIhN, SUMMARY OF CALIORNA Lw, Torts §183 (7th ed. 1960).
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Influencing Witnesses
Penal Code §137 (amended).
AB 1428; STATS 1970, Ch 353
This amendment specifies that force or the threat of force to influence
testimony constitutes a felony.
Under current law anyone who gives, offers or promises a bribe to a
witness in any trial with any understanding that the testimony will be in-
fluenced by the bribe is guilty of a felony. In addition, anyone who "by
any other means fraudulently" attempts to induce a person to give false
or withhold true testimony is guilty of a felony.
The use of the word "fraudulently" could mean the use of any
means to perpetrate a fraud upon courts through false testimony, in
which case "force or the threat of force" would be proscribed by the stat-
ute. But the word "fraudulently" could also mean the use of fraud upon
the witness to obtain the wrong testimony, in which case "force or the
threat of force" may not be included. This amendment clarifies the
ambiguity by specifically stating that the use of force or threat of force
to influence testimony is a felony.
"Threat of force" is defined to mean a credible threat of unlawful in-
jury to any person or his property which is communicated to a person to
induce him to give false or withhold true testimony.
References:
1) CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§9400 et seq.; CAL. PEN. CODE §§127, 128, 653f.
2) 2 WrIKIN, CALIFORNIA CRMES, Crimes Against Governmental Authority §§800,
808, 809, 815 et seq. (1963).
Disclosure of Residence or Telephone Number of Peace Officers
Penal Code §146e (new).
AB 1951; STATs 1970, Ch 1143
Section 146e is added to the Penal Code to provide that every person
who maliciously, and with the intent to obstruct justice or the due ad-
ministration of the laws, publishes, disseminates, or otherwise discloses
the residence of any peace officer without the authorization of the
agency which employs such peace officer, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Selected 1970 California Legislation
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Liftering
Health and Safety Code §13002 (amended); Penal Code §§374,
1463.9 (new); 374b, 374e, 853.6 (amended); Public Resources Code
§5008.7 (new); Vehicle Code §§42001.7 (new); 1803, 23111,
40512, 40512.5 (amended).
SB 902; STATS 1970, Ch 1548
This Chapter amended Sections of and added Sections to the Health
and Safety Code, the Penal Code, the Public Resources Code, and the
Vehicle Code relating to littering.
Section 13002 of the Health and Safety Code prevented throwing or
disoharging of flaming or glowing substances in certain instances. The
Section is amended to make it a misdemeanor to throw a lit or unlit
cigarette, cigar, match, or any substance which might cause a fire upon
any public or private property. Private property owners may use their
property as they wish so long as they do not create a public nuisance, or a
health, safety, or fire hazard, as determined by a local health or fire de-
partment, or the Division of Forestry.
Penal Code Sections 374 and 374b make it a misdemeanor to dump
litter, trash or garbage in public or private places. Public and private
dumps are exempted, as are private property owners who litter their own
property. The Chapter amended Section 374b by restricting private
property owners from dumping refuse on their property if they create a
public health, safety, or fire hazard determined as above.
Vehicle Code Section 23111 makes it a misdemeanor to throw any
flaming or glowing substance from a vehicle onto a private or public
road, or adjacent areas, when the vehicle is outside of a business or re.i-
dential area. The amendment adds "a nonlighted cigarette" and "match"
to the statute. The Chapter makes the act a misdemeanor even if com-
mitted within a business or residential area.
The Chapter extensively amends and conforms the penal consv-
quences for violation of the various codes affected. Punishment for a
violation can be up to 6 months in the county jail and/or up to $500.
The Chapter strikes the possibility of a jail sentence and sets a minimum
mandatory fine for first, second, and third offenses at $10, $25, and $50.
There is still a maximum fine of $500. In addition to the fine, the court
may require second or subsequent offenders to pick up litter for four
hours, and third or subsequent offenders for eight hours. Further, sec-
ond and third offenders may not forfeit bail in lieu of appearing in court
and, absent undue hardship, they must appear in court.
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The Chapter requires conviction of these littering offenses to be filed
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Further, half of the fines col-
lected will be returned to the offended city or county to be used for litter
cleanup activities.
Penal Code Section 374 defines "littering" as the willful or negligent
throwing, dropping, placing, depositing, or sweeping, or causing any
such acts, of any waste matter on land or water in other than appro-
priate storage containers or areas designated for such purposes. "Waste
matter" is defined as any discarded, used, or left over substance, in-
cluding cigarettes, matches, garbage, trash, any nauseous or offensive
matter, and anything likely to injure someone or create a traffic hazard.
Vagrancy
Penal Code §653g (amended).
SB 1385; STATS 1970, Ch 977
Section 653g is amended by this Chapter to add a definition of the
term loiters.
Section 653g provides that every person who loiters about any school
or public place at or near which children attend or normally congregate
is a vagrant, and if convicted is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Loiter means to delay, linger, or to idle about any such school or pub-
lic place without a lawful purpose for being present.
References:
1) 39 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 304 (1962).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVmW OF SELECTED 1967 CODE LEGISLA-
TION 185.
3) Mask, Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, I LOYOLA L. REv. 4 (1968); Cuomo,
Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 463 (1967).
Trespass
Penal Code §602 (amended).
SB 551; STATS 1970, Ch 1607
The acts which constitute criminal trespass are enumerated in Section
602 of the Penal Code. Subdivision (1) prohibits the "entering and
occupying real property or structures of any kind without the consent
of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof." A
recent California case (People v. Wilkinson, 248 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
906) held that "occupying" meant a non-transient, continuous type of
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possession, and therefore, camping for a few days without the consent of
the owner could not constitute a criminal trespass under Section 602.
The original version of the bill used the word "camping" (as well as hik-
ing, loitering and sleeping). However, the final version left "occupy"
in Subdivision (1) of the code section.
Another California case. People v. Brown, (236 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
915) has held that nothing in Section 602 made the refusal to leave upon
request of the owner or possessor after lawful entry a criminal act. This
amendment adds subdivision (n) to Section 602 which specifically de-
clares that a person "refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or
structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to
the general public, upon being requested to leave by a peace officer
and the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof" is
guilty of a misdemeanor. It appears from the language used in this
amendment that a person could enter property for purposes of camp-
ing, hiking, etc., without the intent to "occupy" under the Wilkinson case
and not commit an act proscribed by this Section. However refusing to
leave upon the request of a officer and the owner, his agent, or a person
in lawful possession whether entry is for camping, hiking, (lawful un-
der Wilkinson) or after other "lawful" entry now constitutes a violation
of this Section and reverses People v. Brown.
In addition to the above change, subdivision (m) of Section 602
makes the driving of a vehicle (any device capable of propelling or
moving a person or property upon a highway with power derived from
other than a person; Vehicle Code Section 670) on the land belong-
to or lawfully occupied by another "known not to be open to the general
public" without his consent a criminal trespass.
Reference:
1) 43CAL. JuR. 2d Trespass § 19 (1959).
Traffic Devices; punishment for defacing
Vehicle Code §21464 (amended).
SB 307; STATS 1970, Ch 810.
Section 21464 is amended to provide that the willful defacing of any
official traffic control sign is punishable by imprisonment in a state
prison for not more than five years or a county jail for not more than six
months if the violation results in injury to or the death of a person.
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The Section, as it existed before the amendment, made no specific
provision for punishment for violation and was punishable as a misde-
meanor under Section 40000 of the Vehicle Code.
Abuse of Animals
Penal Code §597t (new).
SB 500; STATs 1970, Ch 1112
Section 597t provides that every person who keeps an animal con-
fined in an enclosed area without providing the animal with an ade-
quate exercise area and restricts the animal by a leash, rope, or chain
affixed in such manner that it will prevent the animal from becoming en-
tangled or injured and permit its access to adequate shelter, food, and
water is guilty of a misdemeanor. Expressly excepted from this pro-
vision are animals in transit in a vehicle or in the immediate control of
a person.
Possession of Weapons
Penal Code § 12021 (amended).
SB 1415; STATS 1970, Ch 1345
(Effective September 17, 1970)
The amendment to Section 12021 establishes a limitation on the scope
of the Section. Prior to this amendment Section 12021 provided that
persons convicted of a felony under the kMw of any state or the United
States, or who are addicted to the use of narcotics are guilty of a public
offense if they owned or were in possession, custody or control of any
firearm capable of being concealed on their person.
By amendment this Section shall not apply to a person convicted of
a felony under the laws of any state or the United States unless the con-
viction of a like offense in California could only result in imposition of
felony punishment, or the defendent had been sentenced to a federal cor-
rectional facility for more than 30 days or received a fine of more than
$1,000 or both such punishments. This Act was an urgency statute.
Prisoners; escape, punishment
Penal Code §4530 (amended).
AB 1644; STATS 1970, Ch 570
Penal Code Section 4530 is amended to provide that any willful fail-
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u:,e by a prisoner to return to the place of confinement will result in im-
prisonment from six months to five years if the prisoner is subsequently
convicted of escaping. Any such conviction under this new provision
which does not involve force or violence cannot be charged as a prior
felony in any subsequent prosecution for another public offense.
Generally, Penal Code Section 4530 concerns state prison inmates
who escape from a state prison or any type of prison camp or farm while
in custody of prison officials.
If a prisoner is convicted of an escape by force or violence, the offense
is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not less than one
year. If the escape is without force or violence, then the sentence is
imprisonment for a term of not less than six months nor more than five
years. These terms commence from the time he would have otherwise
been released from prison.
The above provisions are current law and have not been amended by
this chapter.
Previously the law made no provision for any willful failure of a
prisoner to return to the place of confinement after he had been tLm-
porarily released. (Temporary releases are pursuant to Sections 2690,
2910, or 6254 of the Penal Code or Section 3306 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.) Generally, these Sections allow release for such
reasons as employment, education, work in and around the prison, and
medical research which cannot be performed at the prison.
Reference:
1) 2 WkiiN CALIFORNIA CRrIES, Crimes Against Governrmental Authority ,"865
(1963), (Supp. 1969).
Public Assistance; fraud in obtaining aid
Welfare and Institutions Code § 11483 (amended).
AB 48; STATS 1970, Ch 693
This amendment imposes imprisonment in the county jail for a period
of not more than six months, a fine of five hundred dollars ($500), or
both, if one is convicted of fraudulently obtaining any government aid
for a child not in fact entitled thereto if the amount so obtained is two
hundred dollars ($200) or less. If the amount obtained is more than
two hundred dollars ($200), the defendant shall be imprisoned in the
state prison for not less than one year nor more than 10 years or be im-
prisoned in the county jail for not more than one year. In addition,
actions to obtain restitution shall be brought against the defendant.
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Prior to this amendment a welfare agency's only recourse in cases
where aid to children was given as a result of fraud was to seek recovery
of the money by an action for restitution.
(See also Section 11482 which pertains to one who willfully and
knowingly makes false representations to obtain aid.)
References:
1) 12 OPs. ATry. GEN. 83 (1948).
2) 18B McKINNEY'S CAL. DiG. Paupers (1954); West Key Number 194 Social Se-
curity and Public Welfare.
Motor Vehicles; operation uider influence of dangerous drugs
Vehicle Code §23108 (amended).
AB 1963; STATS 1970, Ch 1370
Section 23108 of the Vehicle Code provides that injury accidents re-
sulting from driving a vehicle under the influence of drugs, other than a
narcotic (Health and Safety Code Section 11001) is a felony. Upon
conviction of such felony, the driver's license of the convicted person
must be suspended pursuant to Section 13350 subsection (e) of the
Vehicle Code. Punishment for such conviction shall be not less than one
year nor more than five years in the state prison or in the county jail for
not less than 90 days nor more than one year, or by fine of not less than
two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five thousand dollars
($5000) or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Prior to the amendment, drug meant any dangerous drug as listed in
Section 4211 of the Business and Professions Code. The amendment
added any drug listed in the provisions of Section 11901 of the Health
and Safety Code.
Vessels and Water Sport Devices; operation restriction
Harbors and Navigation Code §655 (amended).
SB 183; STATS 1970, Ch 402
Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code provides standards
of conduct for those operating any motorboat or vessel and for those
manipulating any water skis, aqua plane, or other similar device.
Previously, this section prohibited one from operating or manipulat-
ing any of the above while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
under the influence of any narcotic drug, barbituate, or marijuana.
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This Section is amended to include any narcotic as defined in Section
11001 of the Health and Safety Code and also inserts a provision against
operating any of the above while under the influence of any restricted
dangerous drug as defined in Section 11901 of the Health and Safety
Code. Sections 11001 and 11901 specifically enumerate all illegal
drugs.
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